There are different interpretations for «compromising material». Some people think it means information that can cause moral, criminal punishment or resignation of office in the higher political levels. Others think that it is negative defaming information, though they do not specify whether this information is true or false. Some people say compromising material is always false information and denigration, denunciation or anonymous statement. As a rule compromising material is received with unfair methods such as tracing, eavesdropping and theft.

Compromising material has become one of the most important weapons in the fight for power and it is closely connected with squealing. Winston Churchill′s phrase «The one who possess the information governs the world» became a saying. It means the person who possesses information may change it at his own discretion. The key to the world is the possibility to modify information the way it is beneficial to the owner of the information. It is the possibility to form compromising information — the most powerful weapon to defeat an enemy or a competitor.

What is the definition of the compromising material processed by the most modern data processing means, such as, for example, computer speech and voices synthesizer? This compromising material is extremely difficult to be detected because it is skillfully introduced into large volumes of original information. This information can be used in most of the countries as the evidence of a criminal offence or commercial crime, because the cost of independent examination aimed to detect the part of the speech fabrication, for example, is rather high and the examination output is not always unambiguous. Besides high-technology examination organizations capable to efficiently analyze and unmask the fabrication are not available in every country. That is why sometimes the decision fully depends on a judge or on those who can influence the judge.

What is compromising material specially processed by a computer, compromising material functioning in an enemy′s or a competitor′s special trustful environment (communication systems)? The destructive force of this information weapon is even more powerful than the power of modern nuclear weapons. It can ruin countries, organizations, companies and private life very quickly.

I. Stalin, H. Goering and H. Hoover were the world leaders in compromising material compilation by means of phone tapping. They collected other′s vices, weaknesses and drawbacks. They had huge data bases with compromising materials based on phone wiretapping practically on everyone: their friends and their enemies. It′s interesting no one has yet found these compromising materials. Probably, someone still uses them. As far as I know from the open press, even Israel has never searched for huge data bases containing wiretap information on Jews in fascist Germany. These data bases were created with the help of Р. Goering′s telephone interception system. Wasn′t it the reason why poor Jews were sent to concentration camps? And where are the documents on phone interception dating back to Stalin period? Most probably, people were sent to concentration camps in Russia after their phone conversations were wiretapped. Thoroughly registered files with compromising materials made it possible for I. Stalin, H. Goering and H. Hoover to hold power for a long time and rule not only their own countries but others as well.

This year S. Lavrov, the head of the Foreign affairs ministry, said 13 acquisition and merger deals worth a total of $50 billion had fallen through recently because of discriminatory measures against Russian companies abroad. S. Lavrov didn′t mention other smaller deals, and probably they were rather big too. Unfortunately Russian Foreign minister didn′t specify why these discriminatory measures were taken against Russian companies and enterprises. Everyone knows that most often they are taken due to improperly received information. To be more exact, competitors form this information to hamper the business of Russian companies. That is what is called compromising material on Russian companies. How is it obtained? These companies are the largest in the world and most issues of the business deals are coordinated in Kremlin. Can information be stolen right from the Kremlin? In order to receive the answer to this question let us look into the history.

The American intelligence started to wiretap Kremlin telephones during the development of mobile communication in the USSR. Only highest state officials had radio telephones protected from interception. Using a standard scanner NSA personnel working in the American embassy listened attentively to L. Brezhnev′s and N. Podgorny′s conversations in their cars. What were Americans interested in most of all? Well, practically in everything, even Leonid Brezhnev′s health, but first of all they were interested in his contacts and relations with colleagues. H. Hoover′s lessons on the overwhelming and precise compilation of compromising material on a person′s life based on phone wiretapping were used in Russia to analyze the behavior of the Soviet authorities. The Americans absorbed all available information about their lives. Naturally they didn′t receive any super secret information, but still there was a possibility to create various compromising materials out of what they got. Then this information could be used to put pressure during negotiations or in specialized mass media PR campaigns. We know from press that CIA receives 90% of information from the analysis of open information, from intercepted phone conversations, in particular. And Israeli military intelligence Aman, unit 8200, which intercepted and decrypted telephone and radio conversations, considers information obtained from phone interception to be most precious. Deputy head of the State technical commission of the USSR  N. A. Brusnitsin writes in his book «Who is eavesdropping on presidents from Stalin to Yeltsin (page 254):

«The Embassy of the USA in Moscow continued to listen and intercept the Soviet leaders phone conversations while they communicated from their cars. Since 1971 this communication was of limited temporary stability. Under certain conditions it was possible to decrypt some of the conversations using modern computer technology. In 1976 a new secure mobile radio communication system was implemented in the Committee for State Security of the USSR. It was designed to serve the heads of the state. It absolutely excluded the possibility to decrypt intercepted conversations. The same equipment was used in state country houses in the Crimea, on the Black sea shore in the Caucasus and in the Mineral Waters. The equipment that provided secrecy was very expensive, so the system of mobile secure communication of the Ministry of the Soviet communications wasn′t protected. Most of the state officials, starting from the Deputy chairman of the council of ministers and lower rank officials used this system.» Americans confirm the telephones of the highest Soviet state officials were wiretapped. Here is some information on the interception of Soviet leaders given in an interesting book by Christopher Andrew «For The President′s Eyes Only» (page 359):

«One of the most closely guarded secrets of the Nixon White House, not even hinted in Nixon′s or Kissinger′s memoirs, was a series of NSA intercepts from the Soviet embassy on Sixteenth Street in Washington. Both Nixon and Kissinger are said to have attached great importance to these intercepts, probably because they provided some sort of check on the working of the back channel and the prospects for détente. The President also took personal interest In Operation Gamma Guppy, begun shortly before his election victory by an ASA unit working under NSA direction at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, which successfully intercepted the microwave radio and telephone communications between the large black Zil limousines of Politburo members as they drove around Moscow. According to one of the limited number of senior CIA analysts cleared for access to the intercepts „the White House was not the only fascinated reader of GAMMA GUPPY material. We analysts poured over these routine conversations (largely between drivers of the Politburo members rather than the members themselves) looking for meaningful insights. There weren′t many to be found. Over time, we learned who hunted and fished with whom, and pieced together the existence of close friendships, but the information was so highly sensitive it couldn′t be alluded to in routinely disseminated analysis on leadership issues!“

Till the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 American intelligence intensively wiretapped phone conversations of all Soviet state officials who had built-in telephones in their cars. Just imagine the amount of interesting wiretapped information on the private life of state officials American special services collected for more than 20 years! Who cared about the secrecy of conversations when they were driving home tipsy after a successful hunting or fishing!

It was mentioned above that compromising materials compiled by means of illegal wiretapping may be fabricated. Is it possible if the speech is encrypted? Let us refer again to the book by Christopher Andrew „For The President′s Eyes Only“ (page 392) The following extract deals with the military conflict between Israel and Arabic countries known as the Suez crisis.

„According to another CIA report, however, SR-71 spy planes „provided the intelligence community with up-to-date knowledge of the disposition of Arab and Israeli forces.“ SIGNINT provided the best intelligence. Though nearly all the details remain classified, it is known that decrypted signals on October 16-17 enabled Lieutenant Colonel Ariel Sharon of Israel to trap and destroy Egypt′s 25th Armored Brigade on the shore of the Great Bitter Lake, thus opening the way to the crossing of the Suez Canal. Other intercepts revealed that Syria′s 47th Armored Brigade was headed toward the Sea of Galilee; its commander was heard boasting that in an hour′s time he would „bathe in it.“ Kissinger devoured „every shred“ of intelligence revealed during the war.“

Probably with the assistance of the American colleagues Israeli special services could not only decrypt the transmissions from the Arabic tanks (made in the USSR, by the way) but they could also modify them in a certain way so that even the Arabic tank crews weren′t aware of the fabrication. The Arabic tanks were trapped near the Galilei Sea because the Israeli fabricated messages were imposed on them. So since 1973 foreign special services have learned not only to decrypt messages sent from our encryption devices but also to modify the encrypted message content. Those who received it considered this message to be original. It is possible in case low cryptographic stability cipher is used. Of course, we are speaking about speech encryption our tactical units used, utilizing the equipment called „temporary stability encryption equipment“.

Foreign special services understood the serenity of encrypted messages fabrication because as a result the maximum effect could be gained. An encrypted message recipient usually trusts the information he receives because the information is received in an encrypted form. In reality this information is modified by the enemy.

American special services intensified the work in this field.

In the mid-1970-s a signal was transmitted via encrypted communication networks to turn on all the available reserve communication systems of the Odessa military district of the USSR. The transmitters went into the air and the enemy could detect all the communication systems located in that district. It is not determined up till the present who modified the encrypted signal to switch on the radio stations.

Here is another example. At the end of the 1970s a Soviet cruiser was given the instruction to dislocate from the Mediterranean Sea not far from Italy to the Syrian shores. An American military ship but not the Soviet was the first to reach the destination point. Later on it became evident there was a serious bug in the equipment that encrypted the cruiser captain′s speech. The instructions from Moscow were transmitted via this equipment. The bug in the encryption equipment made it possible for an enemy to impose false commands on the cruiser captain, though the messages were encrypted. Afterwards the bug in the equipment was rectified.

American special services deepened the research on weaknesses and bugs in Soviet encryption equipment. Most of the bugs in the encryption equipment were caused by the human factor and resulted in its improper operation. Technical and human mistakes were accumulated and, naturally, the American special services made use of them. Judging by the experience a person makes the largest number of mistakes in a critical situation, especially operating complicated equipment when it is transferred from the autonomous to the manual mode of operation. Here is the quotation by the American specialists:

RBC reports with the reference to the article in The Observer that from 1989 till 1991 CIA eavesdropped on the USSR high officials from a tunnel. CIA installed a hi-tech wiretapping system to spy on the high authorities of the former Soviet Union.

According to the former CIA intelligence officer who executed the plan, the device was put in by an American agent who had to wear a protective suit and was guided by satellite and sonar images of Moscow’s underground. This wasn’t part of the Cold War — the intrusion into the seat of Soviet power occurred in 1989, when Washington and Moscow were trying to smooth relations. ’The stories about a five-level city beneath Moscow are true,’ said Tony Mendes, a former Moscow-based CIA technical officer, now retired. ’These are tunnels from ancient times — Ivan the Terrible did a lot of digging. But some of the tunnels were recently made.» CIA agents entered the tunnel system one night equipped with computer guidance systems, air filters and maps. He negotiated the sewer and metro system to reach tunnels running under the Kremlin. That night Mendes was in the Kremlin theatre attending a ballet performance. The audience also included a US spy in the 16th Directorate responsible for electronic intelligence, Major Peter Leonov, and his wife. Two of the ushers were also CIA agents. When the Russian couple went to the toilet during the interval, they were joined by the two agents, who donned disguises to make them look like Leonov and his wife and returned to the couple’s seats. The Leonovs, now dressed as the ushers went to the service lifts. They went to a tunnel and then Leonov showed the agent where to plant the listening device on the Kremlin communication system cable. Leonov left the Soviet Union days later via Finland. Mendes claims the eavesdropping device was instrumental in warning Yeltsin of the imminent coup in August 1991. In fact it helped to gain victory over the State Committee for Extraordinary Situations. President George Bush Senior and British Prime Minister John Major personally informed Boris Yeltsin of the prepared coup, writes the Observer.

We shall specify a little bit what does linking to a secret communication channel mean. Mendes said they could listen to the Kremlin communication system. Probably it means they could listen not only to plain but also to decrypted conversations. (We shall later prove it with the quotation from another American source.) So if the Americans could listen to Kremlin information they could also modify it as it was required, the same way it was done during the Sues crisis, for example. Those times they trapped the Syrian tanks. In 1991 they disrupted the control system of the country′s most senior figures and it caused the collapse of the USSR. The former Russian President  M. S. Gorbachov justly says no one knows the truth about the coup. We can suppose the American special services discovered the weaknesses in our encrypted communication systems. The encryption equipment was extremely expensive. The production volumes of encryption equipment designed to encrypt speech, in particular, were rather small. Their dimensions were huge (the weight of a speech encrypter was nearly 70 kilo) and they were installed only at special orders of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR. Most likely that was why L. Shebarshin, the last head of the Soviet intelligence, wrote in his book «Country — Without Power» that the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Kruchkov was a very prudent and careful person. He was very careful even speaking via secret communication channels.

Probably the head of the KGB was aware of our weaknesses in secret communications.

Possible drawbacks in the organization of the secret communication for the highest Soviet officials and in the organization of the interaction with the executors could play a tragic role during 1991 coup that resulted in the collapse of the USSR. The book by Eugenia Albatz «Delayed Action Mine. KGB Political Portrait» describes in detail the way phone wiretapping of many state employees and the highest USSR officials in the Kremlin was organized. The President of the USSR  M. S. Gorbachov writes in his memoirs that wiretapping devices were installed in his flat as well.

The atmosphere of total suspicion even to the closest friends was a precondition for the correctly fabricated information transmitted into the government communication networks to cause a political crisis. Time was required to check this information but it was critical those times.

The situation was even more aggravated because the head of the state was in Foros and it made it difficult to check the information authenticity. The possibility for an enemy to intrude into our government communication systems was reinforced because according to a state order the number of subscribers to be wiretapped was increased. Those who used encryption devices were among those who were to be intercepted and the state order was to be urgently fulfilled. The communication equipment was transferred to a manual operation mode thus increasing the risk of an error that could be caused by a human factor. The telephone encrypters had to be transferred to a special operation mode for the remote wiretapping.

Thus in 1991 unique preconditions were formed in the country due to a tense political situation. An enemy could interfere into the government communication networks and transmit false information. Such information could cause a political crisis.

False information can be compared to a virus in a computer system. A virus enters the operation system and starts to destroy the whole network the computer is connected to, if appropriate software to detect a virus is not downloaded in the networks. Who is able to define false information in the governmental communication network? Who can discuss of the high-level officials orders, even if they seem to be absurd? There was a standard direction in the USSR that first of all an order was to be fulfilled and only afterwards, if they would let you, you could discuss the correctness of the order at your own risk. Till August 1991 Stalin′s tough and management system which required the implementation of given orders without any questions was practically preserved at the highest state level. One wouldn′t even dare not to obey the order of the President of the USSR. It was impossible those days and could lead to years in prison. Who would check if information is false when it is circulating in the super trusted government communication networks? It is possible to verify information is false but it will take long to do it. By the time it is confirmed the political situation will be irreversible, like in August 1991.

There are a lot of materials written about the coup. Everyone is surprised with the inactivity of the State Committee for Extraordinary Situations officials and their subordinates. The First President of Russia Boris Yeltsin wrote in his memoirs M. S. Gorbachov was waiting in Foros for someone to become a winner. One of them was waiting, the other was taking action, the rest played up to the others. As a result the great country was destroyed.

Why did it become possible in the perfectly adjusted system of the KGB of the USSR, the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of Interior? Half of the country was intercepted. Conversations of all the state officials were monitored. Every step of the democrats was tracked. KGB, Ministry of Defense, Main Intelligence Bureau divisions consisted of trusted and highly- professional specialists capable to fulfill any order to protect the Motherland. Of course, it such an order was issued. Long time afterwards we can assume an enemy intruded into the government communication system. His false orders and directions led to the crisis in the highest power echelon, then the coup and inactivity among the force structures of the country. Probably, it was very late when it became evident. The fly-wheel was started by a skillful hand to destroy the great power and there was no one who could stop it.

Do you remember the well-known report about M. S. Gorbachov′s illness? What information was it based on? Maybe someone fabricated his voice in the government communication channels and gave orders contrary to common sense. And maybe that was the explanation why he was considered to be ill. Voice fabrication technology was very well known to the special services those days and it was successfully made use of. Nowadays this technology is used for peaceful purposes to reconstruct a person′s voice according to a portrait, for example Joconda′s voice reconstruction by the famous Japanese criminalists.

Who analyzed M. S. Gorbachov′s voice and speech via government communication channels after the events — no one did!!! And what about numerous strange visits to Foros paid by the authorities of the State Committee for Extraordinary Situation? Maybe by that time they already seized to trust in their secret communication. Most probably it was the command fabrication that caused this chain reaction, the introduction of the power of the Committee for Extraordinary Situation in the country. Later on when it became clear what had happened there was already a chaos in the country and nobody knew the way out. We were surprised with the inactivity of the State Committee for Extraordinary Situation, and they kept receiving a lot of contradictory information and didn′t know how to act in such a situation. The situation was completely analogue to the behavior of a computer with an operation system infected by viruses.

So as a result M. S. Gorbachov called Arkadiy Volskiy using a standard phone to investigate the strange situation. Maybe plain communication was more reliable than secret. Complete switch-off of M.S. Gorbachov′s cryptographic communication was most probably caused by the fact that Kruchkov had defined someone there was an intruder inside distorting the conversations. So he flew to meet M/S. Gorbatchov in Foros to clear whether the orders were original. But the time was lost. Here is an abstract from the book «For The President′s Eyes Only» by Christopher Andrew (page 530):

«The best and most highly classified intelligence available to Bush during the coup derived from NSA′s success in monitoring communications from Kruchkov and Yazov in Moscow to military command posts around the Soviet Union. SIGINT showed little military support for the coup. A majority of theater commanders refused even to take calls from Moscow. Bush, it is claimed, took the unprecedented decision to pass this intelligence on to Yeltsin. A communications expert at the U.S. embassy in Moscow was assigned to Yelp Yeltsin make secure telephone calls to military leaders. NSA opposed Bush′s decision to share SIGINT with Yeltsin on the grounds that it would compromise its future ability to monitor Russian military communications. For the president, however, the overriding priority was to do everything possible to defeat the coup. In the vent, the coup collapsed more rapidly than had been expected even by those analysts who predicted an „early fizzle“. On the night of August 20-21 the elite KGB Alpha Group refused orders to storm Yeltsin′s headquarters in the Russian parliament building. „We have all kinds of intelligence coming in,“ — Bush told a reporter, but prudently declined to be specific. On August 21 the coup petered out in farce.»

Naturally Bush refused to comment on the concrete achievements of his intelligence, technical in particular. So most probably there are features of the informational war here. It is characterized by the accumulation of a large volume of compromising material on the state authorities and its utilization when the control over the state informational channels is gained, first of all when the communication channels of the sate leaders, the military, special services are conquered.

Later on after the investigation on Robert Hanssen′s case ended the CIA would confess it had installed super secret electronic wiretapping systems in Moscow together with the NSA. The CIA will also confess these wiretapping systems performed very delicate. One may only guess what kind of functions they were. The former official of the American intelligence stated these wiretapping devices were of great importance for the USA because they played the most important role. Very specific precise information usually worth its weight in gold for intelligence was under the consideration.

The informational war was a success and ended with a full collapse of the USSR. Immediately after that a hard blow on the Russian financial system was delivered. As a result the financial payments in the state bank of Russia stopped. Several billion rubles were stolen from the Russian treasury causing tremendous losses in the industry, especially the defense industry, in particular. The enterprises of the former ministry of electronic industry came to a stop. So the activities of one of the most important branches of the industry were purposefully moved decades backwards. As a result Russia doesn′t have a batch production of either modern computers or cellular phones. Like before the same methods to destabilize and destroy the state bank system were used: the substitution of the genuine information by the false. This fraudulent scheme was known as «false aviso». It is not clear up till the present days who organized this largest financial fraud. The Central Bank First Deputy Chairman Andrei Kozlov started to investigate this fraud and was killed in 2006 under rather strange circumstances.

After the August 1991 revolution in Russia the intensive compromising material compilation on the state officials and business men started in Russia. Just recollect the methods used for this purpose: subtle spying, illegal cellular phone interception, pager message interception, shooting compromising video and document fabrication. They could be compared with the methods used in the best detective novels. How many well-known people were suddenly fired without the explanation of the reason, nine authorities of the Russian special services among them. Electronic compromising material started to gain force. Special equipment of private guard companies was sometimes even better than that of the special services. Profits gained from the sales of information became tremendous. Just pay money and receive the required information from detective companies on a commercial basis. The intensive introduction of the mobile communication in Russia contributed to it. It became easier to get compromising material from mobile phone conversations. Then it could be finished off to a required condition — anyway no one checked their authenticity. Those times the mobile communication had practically no protection. And that was the reason why the well-known scandals connected with the interception of highest Russian state officials happened. Atoll company participated in them. Later on Yukos company interception systems were found during the search. During the same period the telephones of Yumashev and other high-ranking state officials were tapped. Compromising material was compiled on the Russian presidential contender Y. Primakov. Information about his illness and medical treatment in a hospital was released in press. Most probably this information was obtained with the help of phone wiretap of his closest circle. Press reports that phone conversations of the President′s daughter Tatyana Dyachenko with the journalist М. Listyev were tapped. V. Listyev was atrociously murdered afterwards. The known pre-election scandals with a Xerox box full of dollars Lisovsky carried out, didn′t do without tapping because it was known exactly when, where and what he carried out. Anatoly Chubays′s voice was professionally fabricated in this scandal to compromise and sue him. The state organization performed a very expensive voice examination and revealed the fabrication of Anatoly Chubays′s voice.

Most of the people who organized the elections of the Russian President were bugged and that may serve as an unprecedented example of phone tapping. That period of the presidential elections in Russia in 1996 reminds of August 1991 as far as the scope of wiretapping is concerned. Boris Yeltsin′s closest friends Korzhakov and Barsukov, and then his doctors who saved his life were fired in 1996. Though lots of negative publications have been recently published it is hard to imagine Boris Yeltsin, the President of Russia, took incorrect decisions, while his security depended on them. Most probably, he was presented the facts he couldn′t object to. Maybe it was the compromising material received by means of tapping and professionally processed by modern electronic equipment in such a way that it could affect Boris Yeltsin′s mind. Every time we analyze famous scandals in Russia we come across the organizations equipped with communication wiretapping means. For example, who were those five Federal Security Bureau officials who came out with the sensational statements concerning the prepared assassination on B. Berezovsky? They worked in one of the most classified subdivisions of the FSB, called Criminal Organization Development Board. That board was could operate autonomously and had all the required technical support, including, as it is known from the press, the most modern mobile phone wiretapping system worth several million US dollars. The procedure of purchasing this equipment in Germany was connected with a big financial scandal. Evidently it is not yet clear whom the finance the equipment was purchased on belonged to. Mikhail Trepashkin, one of those who made a speech at this conference, was convicted for illegal handling of interception materials of the golyanovskaya criminal group. Big scandals connected with the FAPSI authorities? resignation, A. Starovoytov, the Director of the Federal Security Bureau Kovalyov. No one has ever doubted these peoples′ devotion to President Boris Yeltsin. There was no doubt they were highly skilled professionals. Besides the resignations were instant, and even B. Yeltsin couldn′t explain them. Maybe these people were also compromised with a specially prepared compromising material based on the Kremlin phones tapping? We can give two examples of the Kremlin phones wiretapping. They are known from press. These examples demonstrate wiretapping the reception of A. Voloshin, the head of the apparatus of the President of Russia. This information was not classified, but the fact puts one on guard because of the possibility to loose the control over the government communication. Maybe we shall find the explanation and answers to some oа these questions in the interesting book by N. A. Brusnitsin «Who is eavesdropping on the presidents from Stalin to Yeltsin?» (page 89):

To our opinion the task to provide the secret communication for the President of Russia is singled out from the FAPSI supervision (the Federal Agency for the Government Communication and Information under the President of the Russian Federation) and passed over to the Security Service of the President of the Russian Federation is not really grounded in respect to the reliability and security of the government communication. FAPSI provides the communication for all the government structures, except for the President. The communication system is designed and technically functions on the same equipment. Now it is artificially subdivided. For example, the considerable part of the equipment of the mobile president′s maintenance units, the Kremlin Automatic Telephone Stations, are under the supervision of the Federal Guard Service. FAPSI and Federal Security Service duplicate each other maintaining the same equipment. Sometimes it is hard to make out who is responsible for the security of communication and who can eavesdrop on whom. The Federal Guard Service turned out to be in charge of the unified technical equipment on the territory of Kremlin and special establishments, providing the connection of the telephone sets. Under the existing conditions FAPSI cannot be responsible for the communication security, for example, of the prime-minister and his apparatus, the Ministry of defense, the Federal Security Service and all the other subscribers of the government communication, because FAPSI doesn′t completely control the equipment of the communication channels. While before the Committee for State Security in the person of the Government Communication Board was responsible for the security of the government communication, presently FAPSI is helpless in this respect. It is controlled by the president′s Security Service.

Evidently such subordination is determined on purpose. In this case the president′s Security Service has a possibility to eavesdrop on the government phones without any control, and visa versa.

It is hard to object the opinion of a high-skilled specialist who dealt with the organization of the government communication in the USSR for a long time. The quotation of this person shows there is a possibility to intrude in the classified communication of the highest Russian authorities. Probably  V. Putin, the president of Russia, united FAPSI and FSB to exclude the possibility to wiretap the Kremlin phones. As far as I know the tapping of the Kremlin phones was stopped after that unification, anyway there were no reports in press about that.

Still there is another way for the leakage of compromising material. The mobile radio communication installed on Zil cars and designed to serve most of the state authorities was replaced by the cellular communication. Can foreign special services eavesdrop on the phones of state authorities like they did before when they listened to the mobile communication? Maybe it is not an urgent matter, as Vladimir Vasilyev, the head of the State Duma Committee for the security stated in the interview to the informational agency REGNUM on 03.07.2006г.

Let us refer to the article from the NEW YORK TIMES published on January 8, 1999.

Facts on wiretapping mobile phones, radio stations and other communication means of the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein′s closest circle and security service are given in this article. In order to achieve it the mobile phone eavesdropping equipment was brought to Iraq under the disguise of the equipment designed for the US inspectors. After that the office and home telephones of the Iraqi military officers and state officials were intensively telephoned with the aim to threaten and demoralize them before the beginning of the war. Most probably fabricated information was launched into Iraqi secret networks at the beginning of the war. This information based on the compromising material compiled before to disrupt the control over the Iraqi troops and cause distrust in the orders coming from high command. Maybe that was the reason why Hussain invited military of various ranks for personal meetings so frequently, strange as it may seem during combat operations. Probably he felt he was loosing control over the army and as a result Iraq was defeated at a spur of a moment. Complete inertness of most of the Iraqi military officers, including the highest ranks, is amazing in this war. We can suppose the reason for such an inertness was the skillfully formed compromising material, that affected those people. Nowadays when information is the key factor the process of a country′s collapse is characterized by the following stages:

— intensive compilation of compromising material on the state leaders, army, special services and leading business men and their families;
— the arrangement of specially selected compromising material to entice part of the authorities, including army and state special services. As a result the enemy′s side may be taken or silent disobedience. In fact it is also very dangerous during the crisis in a country;
— multiple resignations of the highest state authorities when the reason for the resignation is not explained;
— the intrusion into the informational and governmental communication networks to introduce false information and compromise the orders and commands of the highest state leaders, army and special services. It is very characteristic of the states with tough administration. As a result of such an introduction of false information there may be a burst of political confrontation in a country and distrust among the branches of power and the substitution of the political power for the other. That political power will act for the sake of those who ordered the compromising material. It is the minimum possible result. The maximum result is the military invasion of the country and the concentration of combat operation on the directions where enemy military officers demoralized with the compromising material are located. This kind of an informational influence, the disruption of communication and the introduction of false information will provide the quick victory with minimal losses.

The development of the political events in the Ukraine and Kirgizia reminds very much of the collapse of the USSR. At first the government networks were wiretapped. Then there was uncontrolled wiretapping and compilation of the compromising material on a big number of state employees, including the members of the Constitutional court who will later take the decision on the destiny of Ukraine. As a result the correctly formed compromising material may lead to the direst confrontation of the conflicting parties, distrust between political parties and dissension between the closest brothers-in-arms. It may lead to the change of the political power and the introduction of severe dictatorship in a country. We can see that the necessity to compile compromising material and information on the highest state authorities is still important and will most probably become even more important.

We have considered the way specially formed compromising material may influence the collapse of a country. Approximately the same methods but to a smaller extent, of course, are made use of to destroy a commercial company. At first compromising material about the company owners and leading employees is compiled. Specially formed compromising material is introduced into the company communication networks, including cellular networks, and the company management is thus disrupted. The compromising material neutralizes the correct orders of the company officials and form distrust among the companions. The effect is even stronger if the companions take a decision to create their own home-made protected cellular communication network using lots of SIM cards purchased under false passports. The user authentication in such a network is performed within a minute despite the type of the network operator. The final result is the quick and cheap occupation of the company by a raider company.

The examples of illegal cell phone tapping taken from the open press are given on the web site of Ancort company. The examples demonstrate tapping on dozens of heads of foreign countries and thousands of politicians, business men, party leaders and deputies. Non-authorized eavesdropping of mobile phones was very extensive in 2006. It was caused by the following reasons:

1. Very convenient and prestigious smart phones were manufactured. They united the functions of a computer and a mobile phone.
2. The costs of equipment designed to wiretap mobile phones became lower, their dimensions became smaller and their efficiency increased.
3. The utilization of modern speech and voice synthesizers make it possible to imitate any speech and voice with a very high authenticity level. Their combination with wiretapping systems makes it possible to create any kind of compromising material. It is technically difficult to distinguish the fabrication, it takes long to distinguish it and it is very expensive.
4. Overall compilation of compromising material on state officials, members of their families, people they associate with, including business men so that their competitors or interested parties can manipulate them as they prefer.
5. Overall cellular phone wiretapping and the creation of special compromising material on key persons. Special computer speech synthesizers are used for this purpose. Then the compromising material is introduced into communication networks. Presently it is one of the most effective means to destroy a country or commercial companies.

Probably that is the reason why the President of Russia М. Putin does not use standard cellular communication for his negotiations. In his interview in Internet he said he used protected cellular communication. The same is true with President Bush who created secure cellular communication for the members of the government after the tragic events of September 11th, 2001. Private conversations and compromising material on the leaders of other countries often appear in Internet and books.

Due to some reasons these people do not realize how dangerous it is to talk over standard cellular networks. (For example, a book about the conversations over a mobile phone of the President of France Jack Chirak was published.) These people are surprised so many compromising materials are compiled about them, and most often this material is the reason for their resignation. The Italian Prime minister Romano Prodi said: «This is some kind of a parallel Universe of incredible dimensions.»

Cellular phones are often wiretapped but information about it appears in press more seldom because due to certain reasons neither criminals nor special services want to reveal technical means used to procure data.

The term «friend-foe» is widely known in the military aviation. A special sensor is installed on a plane. A special secret code is introduced in it to confirm the plane belongs to the Russian Air Force. There is a code identification system in the navigation systems located on the ground. It is intended to thoroughly identify the plane is Russian. These plane identification codes if the most classified information in the country. Incase they are lost an enemy can fabricate them and easily enter a country′s airspace. In 1970s a military pilot Belenko hijacked his MIG plane and flew to Japan and they got to know the secret codes «friend-alien» there. It was the main loss The USSR bore. The appropriate systems were to be re-worked for each Soviet military plane. The work to install new codes into the sensors of the Soviet planes was extremely expensive.

In the informational communication networks, those of a bank or cellular, it is of prime importance to identify who the information is received from. False signals and calls can be filtered according to the identification. Only the communication equipment with embedded special cryptographic means designed to protect information provides the correct identification of signal and call authenticity. Of course, if this equipment is handled correctly. We shall give a few examples to demonstrate how the operation of open communication systems may be disrupted causing serious financial losses and sometimes people′s death.

It is not a complicated technical task to fabricate the voice of a person speaking over a phone or radio, especially, if they operate in the digital mode. Nowadays hundreds suits are brought against fraudsters who fabricate their victims voices over the phone to deceive and trim money. Here is an example of the most typical situation. Fraudsters imitate a car accident. One of them pretends to be the guilty person and he calls the victim′s relatives, a mother or a father, asking to pay money so that the suit is not brought against him. The son′s voice was recorded on a special electronic voice synthesizer when he had spoken over the mobile phone. It is not difficult to define mobile phone numbers. The cost of wiretapping has recently decreased, besides small volume of information is required for simple speech modification. Then fraudsters call the victim′s parents and using the synthesized son′s voice try to trim the money. To be more realistic they explain the son′s voice changes due to the crisis situation.

Here is another example. Speaking with a son′s synthesized voice a fraudster asks the parents to bring the money to the airport at once because he needs them for some urgent deal. The money should be passed over to a person they name in the airport. (A singer Leonid Agutin experienced such a situation).

It is known from some press publications that systems designed to impose false commands were used against our army communication systems in Chechnya to trap and annihilate Russian military units.

It is most important to correctly identify a person who is calling you. It is a complicated task as far as open communication systems are concerned if fraudsters skillfully create crisis situations.

Unfortunately, the protection of the personal communication information that belongs to state officials and Russian business men connected with them is very weak. The problem of the protection of cellular phone information is practically not solved in Russia, in respect to mobile conversations of average and small business men. Several thousands crypto phones of ATLAS company, designed to protect mobile conversations of the state officials is a drop in the sea in respect to the real protection against cyber criminals who possess the most modern mobile phone wiretapping systems.

President  V. Putin says cybercrime is the main threat of this century. So why don′t our respected state organs organize the mass development of systems capable to protect against it′s Isn′t this the reason why our Russian companies lost $50.000.000.000?

A. Klepov

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